Patent Amendments and Prosecution History Estoppel Under Festo by Dirksen, Stephen et al.
iBRIEF / Patents & Technology Cite as 2001 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0011
4/4/2001
April 4, 2001
PATENT AMENDMENTS AND PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL UNDER
FESTO
INTRODUCTION
On November 29, 2000, the Federal Circuit retroactively reduced the value of nearly 1.2
million unexpired United States patents by announcing a new rule for the somewhat
obscure doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. Designed to foster clarity in patent
applications, this new pronouncement in Festo Corp v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co.1 allows for easy copying of some patented inventions and reduces patent
owner's ability to prove infringement. This article outlines the change in the law and
discusses the positive and negative consequences of the decision.
BACKGROUND
¶1          Festo examines the interface between the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel and
the related principle of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. To fully comprehend the
implications of the decision, it is necessary to review the purposes and goals of each doctrine.    
       
¶2          The doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine established by the courts to protect
patented inventions.2 In order to find that a patent has been infringed (literal infringement),
every element of the patented claim must be found in the infringing device.3 Thus, a copyist can
avoid literal infringement by making changes so that his or her device does not have the exact
elements disclosed in the patented claim. Any discrepancy between the patented claim and the
accused device will negate a finding of literal infringement.4 
¶3          However, in order to protect patent owners from copyists stealing the patented 
invention by making small or insubstantial changes to the invention, the Supreme Court 
established the principle of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.5 This doctrine allows 
a court to find infringement if the elements of the accused device are "insubstantially" different 
from those disclosed in the patent.6 For example, in this case Festo's patent claimed a device 
with a pair of sealing rings and the defendant's device only employed one sealing ring. In the
court's view, such differences were insubstantial, and thus the court found the defendant liable
for patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.7           
¶4          Because of the inherent uncertainty in the doctrine of equivalents, courts have exercised
their equitable powers to limit the doctrine. An important limit is the principle of prosecution
history estoppel. This doctrine relates to the amendments, statements, arguments, and
representations made by the patent applicant during the course of obtaining a patent.8 Any
statement that limits the scope of the patent made for "a reason related to patentability" is
binding and the applicant will be forbidden (estopped) from later attempting to argue that the
limitation does not exist.9 For example, in this case Festo limited the scope of the application by
amending the application so that one of the elements had to be made of a "magnetizable
material."10 The Federal Circuit held that since Festo had limited the scope of its patent by
requiring a "magnetizable material," it could not later go back and argue that a use of
non-magnetizable material infringed its patent.11           
¶5          Although both infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history
estoppel appear to complement one another, there are interesting questions regarding the
interface between the two doctrines. For example, if an element has been limited by an
amendment, is prosecution history estoppel a complete bar on all possible equivalents to this
element, or is there a range of equivalents still available in an infringement analysis? Moreover,
is an equivalent structure discovered after the submission of the amendment also barred by
prosecution history estoppel, or does the estoppel apply only to those equivalents specifically
disclaimed in the amendment?
¶6          The Federal Circuit has addressed these questions on various occasions and has
developed two lines of cases that give conflicting answers. In about fifty cases,12 the Federal
Circuit has accepted the answer given in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States.13 In Hughes, the
Federal Circuit stated that prosecution history estoppel creates a "flexible bar" to the doctrine of
equivalents in that if the equivalent was not directly surrendered during the application process,
a patent owner may still sue for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.14 
¶7          However, three cases have reached the opposite result and applied a "complete bar" to 
all equivalents.15 The most notable of these cases is Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co.16 In 
Kinzenbaw, the Federal Circuit denied any equivalent to an element that had been limited during 
the prosecution, even when the equivalent was not specifically disclaimed by the 
amendment.17 In fact, the applicant is completely barred from asserting infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.18 
FACTS
¶8          Festo sued its competitor Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (SMC) on grounds
that SMC's products infringed its patented magnetically coupled rodless cylinders under the
doctrine of equivalents. Festo won on all counts19 and was awarded damages.20 Even though the
court found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, there were notable differences
between the SMC's devices and the structures disclosed in Festo's patents:
[f]irst, ... SMC devices... have only a single resilient two-way sealing ring... while the
patents disclose and claim devices with a pair of sealing rings.... Second, the outer
portion of the sleeves of SMC's devices is made of an aluminum alloy, a material that the
parties agree is not a magnetizable material... while the... patent discloses and claims a
sleeve made of a magnetizable material.21
¶9          It is noteworthy that during the application process, the applicant amended the patents
to clarify (1) that the disclosed structure contained two sealing rings and (2) that the sleeve was
to be constructed of a magnetizable material.22           
¶10          SMC appealed the judgment to the Federal Circuit which affirmed the finding of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.23 After deciding a case that clarified
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for further review in light of the new precedent.24 On
remand, the Federal Circuit again affirmed the district court's judgment of infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents.25 The Federal Circuit granted SMC petition for a rehearing en
banc26 resulting in this opinion.
HOLDING
¶11          The Federal Circuit first set out to clarify and expand the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel. During the application process, all amendments that narrow the scope of the
patent claims,27 or change the application so as to comply with one of the statutory requirements
for patenting28 will create a prosecution history estoppel. This estoppel will apply to all
amendments, even if the applicant fails to state a reason for the amendment29 or submits an
amendment that is "not required by the [patent] examiner or made in response to a rejection [of
the patent application]30"           
¶12          More importantly, if a prosecution history estoppel applies from an amendment to a
specific element, "no range of equivalents is available for the amended claim element" under a
doctrine of equivalents infringement analysis.31 In other words, the Federal Circuit adopted the
complete bar test of Kinzebaw: if there has been an amendment creating prosecution history
estoppel, the patent owner is "complete[ly] bar[red]" from asserting a claim of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.32 In determining infringement, courts are simply required to
ascertain whether the amendment created prosecution history estoppel. If the court answers the
question in the affirmative, the court is barred from finding infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.33
¶13          Applying these principles to the specifics of the case, the Federal Circuit held that
since Festo had amended both the elements during the application process, the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel completely barred Festo from asserting infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents for these elements.34 Thus, the district court erred in deciding that a
"non-magnetizable material" was equivalent to a "magnetizable material" and that use of one
sealing ring was equivalent to the use of two sealing rings.35            
¶14          In dissent, many of the judges argued that adoption of a complete bar against all
doctrine of equivalent infringement analyses would unfairly prejudice many industries and
would alter the value of unexpired patents.36 
CONSEQUENCES
¶15          The effects of this decision will be monumental, fostering a change in the way that
practitioners file patent applications. Prior to Festo, past practice has been to claim broadly in
the initial application for a patent, and then negotiate with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office through one or more rejections until arriving at a mutually acceptable set of
claims. However, since most amendments will create a full prosecution history estoppel
regarding every limitation that is amended for patentability purposes, many practioners will not
risk amending their applications. Rather they will draft narrow, more specific claims that will be
more easily understood and interpreted. This increase in clarity may speed the prosecution
process.37 
¶16          More importantly, the increase in clarity will protect a second-comer to an industry.
Since the claims will be more narrowly drafted, it will be more difficult to claim patent
infringement. This change will allow the second-comer to explore technological advances that
would have been discarded or undeveloped due to fear of litigation.38 As stated by Judge Schall:
the [second comer] will be free to improve on the patented technology and design around
it without being inhibited by the threat of a lawsuit because the changes could possibly
fall within the scope of equivalents left after a claim element has been narrowed by
amendment for a reason related to patentability. This certainty will stimulate investment
in improvements and design-arounds because the risk of infringement will be easier to
determine.39 
¶17          At the same time, Festo drastically diminishes the rights of the patent owner. For
example, Festo establishes an easy and foolproof method for a copyist to appropriate patented
technology.40 All the copyist is required to do is (1) search the published prosecution history of
a patent and identify an element of the invention that was amended for a reason related to
patentability; (2) copy the elements of the invention exactly as they appear in the patent, except
for the element that was amended; (3) for the element that was the subject of the amendment,
substitute the disclosed element with another element that is known to be the equivalent of the
disclosed item.41 It does not matter that the change to the disclosed element is "unimportant or
insubstantial."42 Since the new doctrine of prosecution history estoppel will completely bar the
patent owner from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, there is no way for
the patent owner to protect his or her invention.
¶18          The effects of this of this easy means for copying patented technology is compounded
by the fact that this decision applies to all patents, including 1.2 million patents procured by
practitioners before implementation of the new rule.43 Patent owners who submitted
amendments during the application process under the belief that the amendment would not harm
their future rights will now find that by retroactively changing the rules, the Federal Circuit has
drastically reduced the value of their patents because these patent owners cannot stop copyists
from stealing their inventions. Businesses, which licensed patents under the belief that they
would be able to exclude others from using the invention, will now find that the Federal Circuit
has likewise taken from them their ability to obtain a return on their investment.44 
¶19          Moreover, while it is clear that this decision will reduce the number of amendments 
submitted and change the way that many practitioners apply for patents, such changes may not 
lead to positive or beneficial results. Rather than causing practitioners to submit applications that 
are more concrete and understandable, Festo will actually cause practitioners to either (1) not 
disclose the invention and opt to treat the invention as a trade secret (thus defeating the patent 
system's goal of fostering public disclosure); or (2) submit applications that will be allowed 
without amendment, but whose claims are so narrow that they cannot fully protect the invention
(thus defeating the patent system's goal of providing incentives to invent). In either case, the
public loses.
CONCLUSION
¶20          Only time will tell the exact consequences of Festo and whether the benefits of clarity
outweighs the substantial loss to patent owners. Yet, two results are certain: (1) the once obscure
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel will now be brought to the center of many patent
disputes; and (2) many unresolved questions remain as to the exact limits of the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel. For example:
1. What about argument-based estoppel? Do arguments made to the Federal Circuit also
constitute a complete bar any analysis of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents?
2. Does cancellation of a claim constitute an amendment made for a substantial reason related
to patentability, and thus invoke the complete bar?
3. What about a claim that is amended into a means-plus-function claims? Normally,
infringement of such a claim is analyzed under the doctrine of equivalents. However, if there
is a complete bar caused by the amendment, how can any doctrine of equivalents analysis
occur?
4. What about where there are multiple claims covering the same invention and one of the
claims is amended and the other is not? Does the complete bar created by the amendment
apply only to that specific claim, or does it apply to the invention in general?
¶21          Hopefully, the Federal Circuit will continue answer these questions and further clarify
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.
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